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Expanding the Extended Mind: 
Merleau-Ponty’s Late Ontology 
as Radical Enactive Cognition 
 
Gina Zavota 




In this essay, I argue that the late ontology of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, in particular the system he began to develop in The 
Visible and the Invisible, can be conceived of as a form of 
Radical Enactive Cognition, as described by Hutto and Myin in 
Radicalizing Enactivism. I will begin by discussing Clark and 
Chalmers’ extended mind hypothesis, as well as the enactive 
view of consciousness proposed by Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch in The Embodied Mind. However, neither Clark and 
Chalmers’ extended mind hypothesis nor the enactive view of 
consciousness advanced by Varela et al. are radical enough to 
fully capture Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology.  Inasmuch as 
Hutto and Myin’s formulation combines features of the 
extended mind thesis and enactivism, and expresses both in a 
sufficiently radical fashion, it overcomes the deficits of both 
theories and can serve as a translation, so to speak, of Merleau-
Ponty’s “ontology of the flesh” into contemporary terms. In 
particular, their formulation makes explicit several central 
aspects of his theory: the intimate, mutually constitutive 
relationship between perceiver and perceived world, the equal 
weight given to the contributions of perceiver and world within 
this relationship, and the displacement of representational 
content from its central position in the understanding of 
consciousness. It is thus the ideal vehicle for demonstrating 
some perhaps unexpected ways in which Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought is compatible with contemporary conversations 
concerning the nature of mind. 
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t the end of their seminal article “The Extended 
Mind,” in a section intriguingly entitled “Beyond the 
outer limits,” Andy Clark and David Chalmers speculate on 
conclusions that might be drawn if we accept the sort of 
“active externalism” about mind for which they argue. In 
particular, they claim that “we may be able to see ourselves 
more truly as creatures of the world.”i In this essay, I will 
argue that the late ontology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty – 
the system he developed most fully in The Visible and the 
Invisible and the essay “Eye and Mind,” but whose roots 
stretch back to some of his earliest publications – 
anticipates some key aspects of Clark and Chalmers’ 
hypothesis. It thus represents one possible way of viewing 
ourselves as “creatures of the world.” However, I will also 
contend that more recent research in philosophy of mind is 
even closer to Merleau-Ponty’s position than the original 
extended mind hypothesis is. 
 
I will begin with a brief discussion of Clark and Chalmers’ 
extended mind hypothesis, and of the “enactive” view of 
consciousness proposed by Francisco J. Varela, Evan 
Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in The Embodied Mind. 
Unlike Clark and Chalmers, Varela et al. explicitly couch 
their discussion in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology, in particular as presented in the early text 
The Structure of Behavior. However, neither Clark and 
Chalmers’ extended mind hypothesis nor the enactive view 
of consciousness advanced by Varela et al. are radical 
enough to fully capture Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology. 
A 




Thus I will consider a more recent, and more radical, 
formulation, namely Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin’s 
“Radical Enactive Cognition,” which I believe comes 
closest to expressing the theory of mind that was emerging 
in Merleau-Ponty’s late work. Their formulation makes 
explicit several central aspects of his theory: the intimate, 
mutually constitutive relationship between perceiver and 
perceived world, the equal weight given to the 
contributions of perceiver and world within this 
relationship, and the displacement of representational 
content from its central position in the understanding of 
consciousness. It is thus the ideal vehicle for demonstrating 
some perhaps unexpected ways in which Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought is compatible with contemporary conversations 
concerning the nature of mind. It is my hope that such a 
demonstration will serve as a first step toward a more active 
incorporation of his late ontology into these conversations. 
 
Before proceeding, I would like to specify a few things that 
I will not be doing in this paper. First, although I am 
admittedly partial to Merleau-Ponty’s view of conscious 
experience, this paper is not meant as an argument for the 
accuracy of his account or of any other. It is, instead, an 
attempt to illustrate the extent to which the ontology that he 
was beginning to develop in The Visible and the Invisible 
— the so-called “ontology of the flesh” — is compatible 
with some contemporary ideas in the philosophy of mind, 
in particular those stemming from the Anglo-American 
tradition. As a result, I will not consider in detail any of the 
empirical evidence cited within the texts I will be 
discussing but will instead focus on the theories these 
empirical studies are used to support. Finally, although 
Merleau-Ponty clearly owes a great debt to both Husserl 
and Heidegger, and although Heidegger himself is an 
important figure in contemporary discussions of 
consciousness and cognitive science, I will be focusing 




exclusively on Merleau-Ponty, and in particular on aspects 
of his ontology which are not present (at least not to such a 
great extent) in Husserl’s or Heidegger’s thought. That 
having been said, I will now turn to an overview of Clark 




Clark and Chalmers’ 1998 paper represents a challenge to 
traditional forms of externalism about mental content, 
specifically beliefs.ii They ask us to consider Inga and Otto, 
two hypothetical visitors to the Museum of Modern Art in 
New York City. Neurotypical Inga arrives at the museum 
after recalling its location, which she correctly believes to 
be West 53rd St. Otto, who suffers from Alzheimer’s 
disease, looks up the address in a notebook he carries with 
him at all times, and in which he records important 
information; as a result, he too arrives at West 53rd St. 
Clark and Chalmers contend that Otto, no less than Inga, 
believes that the museum is located on West 53rd St., 
inasmuch as “the notebook plays for Otto the same role that 
memory plays for Inga. The information in the notebook 
functions just like the information constituting an ordinary 
non-occurent belief; it just happens that this information 
lies beyond the skin.”iii In other words, certain types of 
cognition, such as Otto’s belief about the location of the 
museum, are “continuous with processes in the 
environment.”iv Otto and his notebook are linked through 
“a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can 
be seen as a cognitive system in its own right.”v Like all 
externalists, they acknowledge that having certain mental 
states entails being related to the environment in a 
particular fashion. 
 
However, Clark and Chalmers are quick to distinguish their 
“active” externalism about beliefs from, for example, 




Hilary Putnam’s semantic externalismvi; they state that, 
while formulations such as Putnam’s consign external 
elements to a passive, historical role, in their active 
formulation, “All the components in the system play an 
active causal role, and they jointly govern behavior in the 
same sort of way that cognition usually does.”vii By 
assigning an active role to an element not only outside the 
brain, but also outside the body, Clark and Chalmers’ 
formulation captures one important aspect of Merleau-
Ponty’s ontology of the flesh, namely the blurring of the 
boundary between mind and world. While Clark and 
Chalmers’ active externalism is still quite far from what 
Merleau-Ponty was proposing, it provides a necessary 
foundation for understanding his thought in the context of 
more recent developments in philosophy of mind. In 
particular, the claim that both internal and external factors 
can play an active constitutive role in cognitive states such 
as beliefs is an important aspect of his late ontology. 
 
In order to appreciate the full extent to which Merleau-
Ponty’s late thought anticipated more recent developments, 
the extended mind hypothesis needs to be expanded and 
radicalized. Mark Rowlands characterizes it as only making 
claims about how it is possible that some mental processes 
are in part composed of environmental elements. While 
these contingencies might seem to render the extended 
mind hypothesis rather weak, it is in fact a substantial 
challenge to traditional ways of thinking about cognitive 
processes. This is the case primarily because it is a claim 
about the constitution of mental processes, as opposed to 
one that merely specifies the necessary environmental 
conditions under which they can take place.viii For 
Rowlands, this makes it stronger than two related theses, 
namely those of embedded and embodied mind or 
consciousness. While my primary focus in this essay will 
not be on either of these theses, it will be helpful to briefly 




describe them, as they underlie much of the discourse on 
enactive mind, which I will consider in the following 
sections.  
 
In the words of Lawrence Shapiro, the embodied mind 
thesis means that “minds profoundly reflect the bodies in 
which they are contained.”ix In other words, a given 
cognitive or perceptual ability is dependent for its character 
on features of the organism’s physiology. To explain 
human vision, for example, we must discuss the 
specifically human visual apparatus, and perhaps other 
aspects of human physiology that are external to the brain 
as well. As a result, discussing “vision in general” is at best 
vague and at worst meaningless, inasmuch as human vision 
is essentially different from the vision of other species, 
given their differing physiology. Rowlands holds that the 
embodied mind thesis is not a significant challenge to the 
traditional Cartesian conception of the mind, inasmuch as 
“real cognition may be dependent for its correct functioning 
on wider bodily structures and processes, but there is no 
reason for thinking that these wider bodily structure and 
processes form part of cognition. Dependence, even 
essential dependence, does not add up to constitution.”x He 
makes a similar claim about the thesis of the embedded 
mind,xi which states that cognition is interactive in nature, 
“the result, at least in part, of causal processes that span the 
boundary separating the individual organism from the 
natural, social, and cultural environment.”xii On many 
occasions, this embedding comes about when cognitive 
functions are, in part, “off-loaded” to the environment in 
order to increase the efficiency and overall cognitive power 
of the organism.xiii  
 
In contrast, the extended mind hypothesis, in which “the 
mind leaks out into the world, and cognitive activity is 
distributed across individuals and situations,”xiv does not 




merely describe a relation of dependence: in extended 
mental states, the relation between the organism and its 
environment is constitutive of those mental states. While 
Clark and Chalmers do not claim that all mental processes 
are extended, the ones that are necessarily result from this 
constitutive relationship. As alluded to above, however, 
even this extended, active externalism does not fully 
capture the character of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, and 
thus I will now turn to a discussion of the thesis of the 
enactive mind, starting with its seminal text, The Embodied 
Mind by Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thomson, and Eleanor 
Rosch, first published in 1991. Clark and Chalmers 
acknowledge The Embodied Mind in a footnote 
accompanying the statement that “cognition is often taken 
to be continuous with processes in the environment.”xv 
Although they do not discuss the book, or elaborate on the 
notion of enactive consciousness, it is clear that they were 




At the time of Clark and Chalmers’ groundbreaking article, 
there was already a growing body of both empirical 
research and philosophical discourse on the issues of 
embodied and embedded cognition.xvi Varela et al. had 
contributed to that literature by developing a theory that 
they called “enactive” cognition. In The Embodied Mind, 
which serves as a response to representationalist theories of 
mind, and computationalism in cognitive science in 
particular, they argue that it is impossible to understand the 
sensorimotor capacities of humans or other organisms 
without considering the environments and contexts with 
which the organism engages. This engagement, they argue, 
can occur without the need for the organism to internally 
represent features of the external world or to process any 
sort of data gained from its interactions with that world. In 




enactive, “noncomputational” cognitive science, then, 
embodied and embedded activity takes the place of 
representational cognition as the central object of inquiry. 
Enactivism goes further than embodied and embedded 
cognition, however, by claiming that the organism “enacts” 
a world through its actions and choices. Thus “cognition is 
not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven 
mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on 
the basis of a story of the variety of action that a being in 
the world performs.”xvii  
 
The analysis contained in The Embodied Mind is 
particularly valuable for the current discussion due to the 
authors’ use of Merleau-Ponty’s thought as a guiding 
thread for their project. Like Merleau-Ponty, and unlike 
Clark and Chalmers, Varela et al. focus much of their 
attention on perception. For them, “the enactive approach 
consists of two points: (1) perception consists in 
perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures 
emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that 
enable action to be perceptually guided.”xviii With respect 
to the first point, they argue that world and perceiver are 
intermeshed, insofar as the perceiver’s actions are guided 
by the structure of its sensorimotor systems, and that those 
actions in turn effect changes in the world. The latter claim 
is not meant as a statement of psychologism; rather, it 
asserts that the manner in which an organism habitually 
navigates and interacts with its world is constitutive, in 
part, of the way in which that world is experienced. 
Perception is thus “not a passive mapping of external 
features but a creative form of enacting significance on the 
basis of the [perceiver’s] embodied history.”xix Instead of 
attempting to discern how a perceiver is able to extract and 
process relevant data from a pregiven world — a question 
which they claim lies at the heart of representationalist 
theories of mind — the enactive view of cognition 




acknowledges that the actions of the perceiver are 
ultimately a reflection of the nature of both its embodiment 
and its environment, the latter of which is itself enacted by 
the perceiver. To defend their second point, Varela et al. 
focus on the activity of categorization, which is 
fundamental to cognition in both humans and other species. 
Certain basic levels of categorization (one example they 
give is our tendency to classify an object we may be sitting 
on as “a chair,” as opposed to simply “furniture” on the one 
hand, or “an armchair” or “an office chair” on the other) 
arise based on an intersection of biological, cultural, and 
cognitive demands and are thus “the point at which 
cognition and environment become simultaneously 
enacted.”xx In other words, we mentally default to certain 
categories when we attempt to understand or describe our 
experience, due to their having emerged as the most 
efficient, both cognitively and socially. 
 
As Varela et al. point out, Merleau-Ponty himself advances 
just such an active connection between perception and 
action, and between perceiver and world, even in his 
earliest works. While the ultimate goal of this essay is to 
explore the similarities between enactive and extended 
models of cognition and Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology, to 
do so effectively requires at least a brief discussion of some 
of his earlier works, in which he lays the groundwork for 
his later position. Indeed, his first book, The Structure of 
Behavior, begins with the statement that “Our goal is to 
understand the relations between consciousness and 
nature.”xxi A few pages into the work, he states that  
 
Since all the movements of the organism are 
always conditioned by external influences, 
one can, if one wishes, readily treat behavior 
as an effect of the milieu. But in the same 
way, since all the stimulations which the 




organism receives have in turn been possible 
only by its preceding movements which 
have culminated in exposing the receptor 
organ to external influences, one could also 
say that behavior is the first cause of all the 
stimulations. 
 
Thus the form of the excitant is created by 
the organism itself, by its proper manner of 
offering itself to actions from the outside.xxii 
 
While The Structure of Behavior is far removed from the 
ontology of the flesh that Merleau-Ponty develops in his 
last works, it is important for understanding his intellectual 
trajectory. Drawing on his interest in descriptive 
psychology, as well as the work of the Gestalt theorists, he 
begins there what would become a lifelong quest to find an 
alternative to both behaviorism (which he refers to as 
“objectivism”) and Neo-Kantian “intellectualism”xxiii – a 
quest which comes to fruition in The Visible and the 
Invisible and other late texts. Although Varela et al. focus 
primarily on The Structure of Behavior, this does not mean 
that they are unaware of the significance of Merleau-
Ponty’s later work for their enactive approach. In fact, they 
motivate their focus on Merleau-Ponty in part by pointing 
out that, unlike Husserl or Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty 
acknowledged that not only the sciences, but even 
phenomenology itself, “explicated our concrete, embodied 
existence in a manner that was always after the fact. . . . 
precisely by being a theoretical activity after the fact, it 
could not recapture the richness of experience; it could be 
only a discourse about that experience.”xxiv This 
acknowledgement of a level of experience that is prior to 
any attempt at rational explanation is a large part of what 
makes Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology so compatible with 
the enactive approach to consciousness. Inasmuch as this 




aspect of enactivism is not as fully developed in The 
Embodied Mind as it is in later works on enactive cognition, 
in the following section I will consider one of those later 
works, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin’s Radicalizing 





Before proceeding, I would like to briefly address the 
question of what enactivism can contribute to an 
explanation of Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology beyond what 
is furnished by the extended mind hypothesis, with its 
active, constitutive externalism. Rowlands summarizes the 
difference succinctly with his argument that, whereas the 
extended mind hypothesis makes a claim about the 
constitution of certain mental processes and activities, 
enactivism addresses an organism’s expectations about 
sensorimotor experiences and the way that organism is able 
to navigate the world.
xxvii
xxviii
xxv He argues that enactivism “turns 
on expectations and abilities rather than exploratory 
activities. And there is no reason for thinking that either of 
these are extended in the sense required to make 
[enactivism] a form of EM [extended mind].”xxvi While I 
agree with Rowlands that there is nothing about enactivism 
that implies that mind is extended, I do not share his worry 
that “it is not even clear that they are compatible views.”  
Not only, as I argue, does Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology 
contain elements of both, but more recent texts, such as 
Hutto and Myin’s, have put forward versions of enactivism 
in which the types of “expectations and abilities” that 
Rowlands describes are conceived of as fundamentally 
extended in Clark and Chalmers’ sense.  These more 
recent, and more radical, formulations are thus, in a sense, 
hybrids which draw on both the extended mind hypothesis 
and the work of Varela et al. and other early enactivists. 




Hutto and Myin incorporate aspects of both of these 
traditions into what they call Radical Enactive (or 
Embodied) Cognition (REC), characterized by an 
“uncompromising and thoroughgoing rejection of 
intellectualism about the basic nature of mind, abandoning 




They hold that cognition, and indeed all mentality, consists 
in an organism’s contextually embedded interactions with 
its environment. As we have seen, Clark and Chalmers 
confine their discussion to the practice of “offloading” 
one’s memory onto a device external to the body and thus 
leave open the possibility that, in the vast majority of cases, 
cognition remains brain-bound. Hutto and Myin, however, 
argue that mind is essentially distributed among brain, body 
and environment and “that minds are already, in their basic 
nature, extensive and wide-ranging.”xxx In their 
formulation, brain-bound mentality is a rare exception, not 
the rule.xxxi The rejection of the idea that mental activity 
necessarily requires content is what makes Radical 
Enactive Cognition so radical. While acknowledging that 
“some very important forms of cognition essentially 
depend on the interactions between propositional 
attitudes,”  Hutto and Myin maintain that this is not 
always, or even frequently, the case. In fact, they attribute 
the stagnation in the further development of the extended 
mind hypothesis to a reluctance on the part of theorists to 
divorce it from the notion of mental content. In opposition 
to those who insist that any theory of cognition must be 
based on representational, contentful mental activity, 
“Defenders of REC argue that the usual suspects — 
representation and computation — are not definitive of, and 
do not form the basis of, all mentality.”  
 
In their strong reaction against representationalist theories 
of mind and the notion that cognition necessarily involves 
content, we see an echo of the critique of intellectualism 




that Merleau-Ponty outlines in the Preface to 
Phenomenology of Perception, which sets the tone for the 
rest of that volume. In a more extensive articulation of 
themes already present in The Structure of Behavior, he 
criticizes the Vienna Circle for their doctrine that “we can 
enter into relations only with meanings” in the traditional 
sense, asserting instead that, in a pre-predicative layer of 
consciousness, “can be seen appearing not only what words 




 In a similar vein, he 
calls into question Husserl’s eidetic reduction, the process 
of “free variation” within the imagination of the features of 
a given mental object, which Husserl claims allows us to 
intuit its “essence,” or the fundamental features shared by 
any set of such objects.xxxv The reduction is thus a reflective 
process of abstraction from our lived experience that yields 
ideal species, which in turn reveal to us the basic structure 
of that experience. Merleau-Ponty, however, claims that the 
eidetic reduction results from “the determination to bring 
the world to light as it is before any falling back on 
ourselves has occurred,”  in other words, before we have 
begun imposing our own representationally-based 
conceptions onto it. While Husserl acknowledges that the 
world is experienced as “pre-given” or already present 
when we perceive it, Merleau-Ponty hints that he fails to 
fully recognize the implications of this claim. In particular, 
in attempting to understand our experience of the world 
through a reflective examination of intentional content, 
Husserl attempts “to make reflection emulate the 
unreflective life of consciousness.”  This critique is 
significant, inasmuch as, with the notion of the 
“unreflective life of consciousness,” Merleau-Ponty has 
already begun to focus on a level of consciousness that is 
prior to representation and to the “interactions between 
propositional attitudes”  that Hutto and Myin claim are 
not essential to most forms of cognition. Like Merleau-
Ponty, Hutto and Myin acknowledge that contentful mental 




states do exist, but they suggest that “representationally 
based cognition might be just the tip of the cognitive 
iceberg,”xxxix concealing a vast expanse of non-
representational cognition under its surface.  
 
Hutto and Myin see themselves as holding a far more 
radical view of the nature of mind than Clark and 
Chalmers’ extended mind hypothesis entails; they even 
replace the notion of mind being extended with that of its 
extensiveness in order to emphasize this distinction. Much 
as Varela et al. maintain, in the context of their discussion 
of Merleau-Ponty’s early work, that “we must see the 
organism and environment as bound together in reciprocal 
specification and selection,”
xliii
xl Hutto and Myin endorse 
what they call the “Equal Partner Principle” in the 
understanding of mental activity, namely that 
“contributions of the brain are not prioritized over those of 
the environment.”xli In so doing, they echo an important 
theme in Merleau-Ponty’s work, one which is particularly 
evident in The Visible and the Invisible but which can be 
seen in embryonic form in Phenomenology of Perception, 
namely the parity of the brain and the environment in the 
constitution of mental activity. While not yet going so far 
as to call into question the boundary between self and 
world, as he later would, Merleau-Ponty holds that “we are 
through and through compounded of relationships with the 
world”xlii and speaks, in a discussion of sense experience, 
of “another self which has already sided with the world, 
which is already open to certain of its aspects and 
synchronized with them.”  This “other self” is that in us 
which senses and perceives: not the contentful mind, but 
rather the “unreflective life of consciousness” that 
underlies it. In The Visible and the Invisible, the notion of 
“flesh” takes the place of the “other self,” and Merleau-
Ponty makes claims even more radical than those of 
Phenomenology of Perception, particularly regarding the 




mutually enactive relation between self and environment. 
In that text, his ideas are even closer to those of Hutto and 
Myin, who directly state that “REC takes at face value . . . 
that the specified bodily and environmental factors are 
equal partners in constituting the embodied, enactive 
intelligence and cognition of these artificial and natural 
agents.”xliv While Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly 
discuss the notion of parity, it should be clear, even from 
the cursory examination of his earlier work that we have 
undertaken thus far, that he places great importance on the 
role played by the world in the constitution of conscious 
experience. As we will see in the following sections, he 
goes even further in his later works, effectively nullifying 
the distinction between the contributions of self and world, 
and thereby rendering them “equal” in a sense perhaps 
somewhat different, but no less fundamental, than that 
intended by Hutto and Myin.  
 
Hutto and Myin’s notion of extensiveness is closely tied to 
the Equal Partner Principle, which, in rejecting the priority 
of brain-bound contributions to cognition, also provides a 
response to internalist critics of the extended mind 
hypothesis who argue that brain activities must be 
“metaphysically sufficient” (i.e., representational and 
contentful) to qualify as cognition. For Hutto and Myin, 
proponents of this type of position are already committed 
to prioritizing the brain’s contributions to mental activity 
over those of the environment, and they seize upon the 
notion of content to help make their case. By construing 
mind as not essentially contentful, Hutto and Myin believe 
they have provided a definitive counter to all such 
objections, insofar as internalists can no longer fall back on 
contentful mental states as the basis of mind. As they put it, 
 
If REC is right, basic cognition is not 
contentful; basic minds are fundamentally, 




constitutively already world-involving. 
They are, as we say, extensive. For to accept 
REC’s thoroughgoing rejection of content in 
this domain is to reject the idea that basic 
minds might be non-extensive — i.e., 
essentially internal and brain-bound because 
contentful. xlv 
 
Radical Enactive Cognition thus represents a very explicit 
and thorough intertwining of enactivism and a radicalized 
variation of the extended mind hypothesis, and it therefore 
serves as an extremely effective lens through which to 
understand Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology within the 
context of contemporary philosophy of mind. Not only does 
it capture the mutually constitutive relation between mind 
and world and the emphasis Merleau-Ponty places on their 
parity in this relation, but the claim that mind is not 
fundamentally contentful speaks to Merleau-Ponty’s focus 
on the pre-predicative levels of cognition and his sustained 
critique of “intellectualism” and its premise that 
consciousness is essentially structured by reason. Both of 
these themes, while present in his earlier works such as 
Phenomenology of Perception, are most fully developed in 
The Visible and the Invisible and the late essay “Eye and 
Mind.” With this in mind, I will now turn to an examination 
of these texts to demonstrate just how compatible Merleau-
Ponty’s late ontology and Hutto and Myin’s Radical 




The Visible and the Invisible was incomplete at the time of 
Merleau-Ponty’s death in 1961, and thus any attempt to 
make definitive statements about its ultimate direction 
necessarily involves speculation. One thing that is clear, 
however, is that it represents a bold critique not only of 




transcendental philosophy, but also of the empiricist 
tradition in Western thought. In it, Merleau-Ponty seeks to 
describe a pre-objective state, before “philosophy declares 
itself to be reflection” and makes the distinction between 
subject and world, and before experiences are “worked 
over” by reflective consciousness.
xlvii
xlviii
xlvi In doing so, he calls 
into question some of the fundamental tenets of 
phenomenology, including the notion of the intentionality 
of mental states, famously described by Franz Brentano as 
“reference to a content, direction toward an object.”  In 
other words, to use an often-repeated expression, 
“consciousness is always consciousness of something.” For 
Brentano, all (and only) mental states have the property of 
intentionality; indeed, in an attempt to distinguish mental 
and physical phenomena, he suggests that “We can, 
therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are 
those phenomena which contain an object intentionally 
within themselves.”  While Husserl, a student of 
Brentano’s, departed from his theory of intentionality in 
some fundamental ways,xlix the description and analysis of 
intentional acts is still a central concern of classical 
Husserlian phenomenology.l Merleau-Ponty, however, 
thoroughly rethinks Husserl’s conceptualization, thereby 
also calling into question the notion that cognition is 
essentially contentful. 
 
Merleau-Ponty addresses intentionality as early as 
Phenomenology of Perception. Working from Husserl’s 
conception, he points out that the purpose of 
phenomenological analysis is not recreating the world 
within reflective consciousness, but rather “recognizing 
consciousness itself as a project of the world, meant for a 
world which it neither embraces nor possesses, but towards 
which it is perpetually directed – and the world as this pre-
objective individual whose imperious unity decrees what 
knowledge shall take as its goal.”li Picking up on a theme 




from Husserl’s late work,lii he distinguishes traditional 
intentional acts from what he calls “operative 
intentionality” or “that which produces the natural and 
antepredicative unity of the world and of our life, being 
apparent in our desires, our evaluations and in the 
landscape we see, more clearly than in objective 
knowledge, and furnishing the text which our knowledge 
tries to translate into precise language.”liii Operative 
intentionality thus encompasses desires, sensations, 
evaluations and other types of non-objectifying mental 
experiences that serve as a ground for objectifying 
intentional acts. Although Merleau-Ponty clearly still 
conceives of these types of experiences as intentional, for 
him (unlike for Husserl) they are not intentional acts and 
thus do not have content or meaning in the same way that 
intentional acts do. Drawing this distinction within the 
realm of intentionality thus allows Merleau-Ponty to focus 
on the pre-predicative layer of experience and to emphasize 
its fundamental role in the structuring of consciousness. He 
thereby mirrors Hutto and Myin’s rejection of contentful 
mental states as fundamental to mind, and their relegating 
of such states to “the tip of the cognitive iceberg.”  
 
This theme continues in “Nature and Logos: The Human 
Body,” a lecture course from 1959-60 in which Merleau-
Ponty casts the prepredicative level of perception as a 
language, albeit a “tacit” one: “An organ of the mobile 
senses (the eye, the hand) is already a language because it 
is an interrogation (movement) and a response (perception 
as Erfühlung of a project), speaking and understanding. It 
is a tacit language.”liv Whereas traditionally language is 
seen as an expression of the “higher,” contentful cognitive 
abilities of humans, Merleau-Ponty claims that “our body 
is symbolism” and that language is “a second body,”lv 
thereby inverting the traditional relationship between 
contentful, representational mental activities and the more 




fundamental, contentless activities on which they are 
grounded. While Merleau-Ponty is not claiming that 
spoken or written language is contentless – Hutto and Myin 
also make it clear that they believe that organisms that have 
language “are capable of genuinely contentful, 
representational modes of thinking and reasoning”lvi – he 
does attribute a great deal of the structure of language to 
the realm of the contentless and nonrepresentational. If the 
capacity for symbolic manipulation that is necessary for 
language is already present in the body, then language in 
the traditional sense is no longer a radically distinct 
capacity that emerges only in the “higher” cognitive 
realms, but is rather an outgrowth of cognitive modes that 
are already present at more fundamental levels of 
cognition. This line of reasoning is very much in keeping 
with Hutto and Myin’s statement that Radical Enactive 
Cognition “denies that basic mentality and cognition 
should be modeled in terms of propositional attitudes.”lvii 
Rather than the type of thinking present in language being 
the paradigm through which all cognitive activity is 
understood, Merleau-Ponty turns the tables, using 
prepredicative mental activities as the paradigm through 
which to understand language. 
 
Merleau-Ponty is motivated to expand the traditional model 
of intentionality, and of cognition in general, in part 
because that model distances consciousness from the 
world, and he believes that there is no such distance 
between a perceiver that is capable of such things as sight 
and touch, and the world containing the objects of these 
senses. This belief is expressed most clearly in The Visible 
and the Invisible, particularly in the chapter entitled “The 
Intertwining – The Chiasm.” He argues there that while, for 
example, seer and seen are not indistinguishable, they are 
intermeshed such that there is never a point at which a self-
identical, empty object is presented to a vision which fills 




it with significance. A color such as the particular red of a 
woman’s dress is “not a chunk of absolutely hard, 
indivisible being, offered all naked to a vision which could 
be only total or null;”lviii in other words, the red is not 
merely a placeholder for perception (human or otherwise), 
waiting to be imbued with significance by a vision which is 
able to identify it as a quality of a particular object. Rather, 
the red, the dress, and the perceiver all belong to one reality, 
none of whose components has a stronger claim to actual 
existence than any other. They are all woven into a single 
fabric, which extends “between the alleged colors and 
visibles” forming a pervasive ground of their materiality, 
which Merleau-Ponty characterizes as “the tissue that lines 
them, sustains them, nourishes them, and which for its part 
is not a thing, but a possibility, a latency, and a flesh of 
things.”lix  
 
This notion of the flesh, which is central to Merleau-
Ponty’s late ontology, is an expression of the intertwining 
of perceiver and perceived, and of self and world. It reveals 
a mind which is essentially extensive, as in Hutto and 
Myin’s formulation, and which conforms to their Equal 
Partner Principle by almost completely erasing the 
distinctions between the contributions of brain and world 
to perceptual experience. This is a radically enactive view 
of consciousness, in which, to repeat the words of Varela et 
al, “cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world 
by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world 
and a mind.”lx In “Eye and Mind,” Merleau-Ponty argues 
that “Immersed in the visible by his body, itself visible, the 
see-er does not appropriate what he sees; he merely 
approaches it by looking, he opens himself to the world. . . 
. My movement is not a decision made by the mind . . . It is 
the natural consequence and the maturation of my 
vision.”lxi On this view, motion is impossible outside the 
context of a vision which engages pre-objectively with the 




world. Central to this idea is the fact that “the world is made 
of the same stuff as the body,”
lxiii
lxii namely physical matter. 
My body is thus itself visible in precisely the same way as 
other objects in the natural world are, meaning that it is 
something which both sees and is seen. For Merleau-Ponty, 
this is a fundamental characteristic of human vision and the 
human body, without which it would be “not really flesh, 
not really the body of a human being.”  The nature of our 
conscious experience of being embodied human beings is 
thus conditioned by the particular structure of our sense 
organs and their interaction with the environment, in line 
with embodied and embedded theories of cognition. 
Merleau-Ponty goes further than this, however, to argue 
that “There is a human body when, between the seeing and 
the seen, between touching and the touched . . . a blending 
of some sort takes place.”lxiv  
 
This represents what is arguably an even more radical form 
of enactivism than that which Hutto and Myin propose, 
whereby the brain and the world are not only equal partners 
in the constitution of the self, but their “partnership” 
becomes something closer to a union. There can be no 
question of prioritizing the contributions of one partner 
over the other, for it becomes difficult to even speak of a 
contribution that originates from the brain or the 
environment alone. Brain, body, and nature alike are 
embedded in the same material realm and are thus all part 
of a larger, all-encompassing unity. This intertwining – 
which Merleau-Ponty refers to as the “reversibility” of the 
senses – thus points to an underlying interconnectedness 
that is characteristic of the physical world as a whole, 
making an assignment of priority to the brain seem arbitrary 
at best. Particularly in moments when we are engaged in 
activities such as painting a landscape or portrait, which 
require sustained and intimate contact between the painter 
and the environment, “it becomes impossible to distinguish 




between what sees and what is seen, what paints and what 
is painted.”lxv Merleau-Ponty describes this intermeshing 
of seer and seen particularly vividly in a striking passage 
from Phenomenology of Perception, where he states that 
 
As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not 
set over against it as an acosmic subject; I do 
not possess it in thought, or spread out 
toward it some idea of blue such as might 
reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself to it 
and plunge into this mystery, it ‘thinks itself 
within me.’ I am the sky itself as it is drawn 
together and unified, and as it begins to exist 
for itself; my consciousness is saturated with 
this limitless blue.lxvi 
 
This interconnectedness and reversibility are central to the 
notion of “flesh,” which forms the centerpiece of Merleau-




Throughout “The Intertwining – The Chiasm,” Merleau-
Ponty emphasizes this immanent connection, and attempts 
to explicate the notion of the flesh, by focusing extensively 
on touch, in addition to his discussions of vision. More than 
any other sense, touch is uniquely well suited for such an 
analysis, given the comparative ease with which the 
interplay between the sensing and sensible aspects of 
bodies can be demonstrated with reference to it. To cite just 
one well-known example, Merleau-Ponty asks us to 
imagine placing our left hand on top of our right, while the 
latter in turn touches an object in the world. Referring to 
the right hand, he states that “Through this crisscrossing 
within it of the touching and the tangible, its own 
movements incorporate themselves into the universe they 




interrogate, are recorded on the same map as it.”lxvii
lxviii
 
Importantly, he adds, “it is no different for the vision:”  
touch may be the paradigm sense, but this “reversibility” is 
inherent in all senses. Just as “the “touching subject” passes 
over to the rank of the touched, descends into the things,” 
the visible “palpates . . . the visible things”lxix with this 
same immediacy. This “palpation” is not a function of 
representational thought, however, but rather of the pre-
predicative, contentless cognitive realm that underlies it. In 
fact, Merleau-Ponty goes so far as to say that “vision 
divides itself. There is the vision upon which I reflect; I 
cannot think it except as thought, the mind’s inspection, 
judgment, a reading of signs. And then there is the vision 
that really takes place.”lxx Clearly, for Merleau-Ponty, what 
“really takes place” does so independently of the workings 
of representational cognition. 
 
This initial account is somewhat of a simplification, 
however, for it is impossible for my hand — or anything 
else — to truly be at once touching and touched. In reality, 
“one of two things always occurs: either my right hand 
really passes over to the rank of touched, but then its hold 
on the world is interrupted; or it retains its hold on the 
world, but then I do not really touch it — my right hand 
touching.”
lxxii
lxxi True reversibility is thus “always immanent 
and never realized in fact.”  While it might seem that this 
refinement only serves to introduce a new dualism into 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology to replace those that he hopes to 
overcome, in fact it represents nothing more (and nothing 
less) than an acknowledgment of the inherent potential for 
each of the two states to become the other. At any moment, 
my right hand, being touched by my left, can become a 
hand touching an object in the world; in this sense, there is 
never touching without the potential for being touched. 
Thus touching always carries with it an implicit possibility, 
the “memory” of being touched, which “encroaches” on my 




experience of touching myself or someone else, leading 
Merleau-Ponty to ask “Where are we to put the limit 
between the body and the world, since the world is 
flesh?”lxxiii  
 
The flesh, then, is in one sense fundamentally just this 
reversibility of the senses, “the coiling over of the visible 
upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching 
body.”lxxiv This reversibility speaks to a mutually 
constitutive relationship that extends beyond even that of 
Radical Enactive Cognition, with an intimacy that 
encompasses both the actions and the expectations of the 
perceiver. Acknowledging this “coiling over” and 
“encroachment” of the visible upon the seeing, along with 
the parity of vision and touch, leads naturally to the 
conclusion that I affect the world through my vision no less 
than through touch and am, in turn, affected by the visible 
as much as I am by the tangible. In fact, the very distinction 
between visible and tangible worlds is a spurious one, 
inasmuch as, “Since the same body sees and touches, 
visible and tangible belong to the same world.”lxxv If my 
perceptual faculties and the perceived world are so 
thoroughly enmeshed, and if vision has the immediacy of 
touch, then the probing and speculating I do that allows me 
to form expectations about the world cannot be 
disentangled from the activities I engage in as I interact 
with the environment. Both aspects of perception are 
distributed among brain, body and world, while the 
boundaries between them, so significant in representational 
and computational theories of mind, become blurred 
beyond recognition. 
 
When he speaks of vision as “a palpation with the look,”lxxvi 
Merleau-Ponty is thus not just making a poetic statement 
but is emphasizing the way in which vision, embedded as it 
is within the same order of being as the visible, cannot help 




but affect the visible through its activity, in much the same 
way as when, for example, I move my hand, I cannot help 
but displace some physical matter. Every act of sensing is 
thus inherently creative. One of the most succinct 
expressions of this view is found in Merleau-Ponty’s 
formulation of a familiar phenomenological statement: 
“The body is not only a thing, but also a relation to an 
Umwelt [environment].”lxxvii
lxxviii
 Importantly, he also holds that 
it is the body, and not representational thought, that defines 
our essential humanity. In “Nature and Logos: The Human 
Body,” in a section in which he is discussing the place and 
importance of the human body in the study of nature, he 
insists that “The concern is to grasp humanity first as 
another manner of being a body.”  If our humanity 
should be known first and foremost through our 
embodiment in a certain type of body with certain sorts of 
sense organs and ways of perceiving the world, and if this 
body is fundamentally relational, unable to be separated 
from its embeddedness in its environment, then what makes 
us human is essentially our mutually enactive relation with 
the world. Nature is as responsible for what we call mind 
as the brain is. 
 
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty insists, not only every act of 
sensing, but also every act of being sensed, is imbued with 
this generativity. This is the case because the “matter” 
which constitutes perceptible objects is not some dead, 
inert stuff that is passively acted upon, and which only has 
meaning insofar as it can be formed into sensible things. It 
is, by contrast, as active and vital as the senses themselves, 
necessarily affecting the sensing body each time this body 
“palpates” the world through its powers of sensation. 
Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology is thus a sort of inversion of 
the ontology that Clark and Chalmers predicted at the end 
of their landmark article: communication and action have 
not been reconceived as being like thought, but rather, 




thought has dissolved into action and perception. It thus 
provides a profound example of how we might “see 
ourselves more truly as creatures of the world”lxxix and is a 
significant precursor of some of the most intriguing 
developments in recent philosophy of mind. Most notably, 
as I have argued, it anticipates some of the most important 
features of Hutto and Myin’s Radical Enactive Cognition, 
namely its claims that much of cognition is contentless and 
that contributions of the environment should be weighted 
equally with those of the brain in the understanding of 
mental activity. By pointing out these affinities between 
Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology and contemporary 
discussions, I hope to have provided some impetus for 
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